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Summary
Terrorism and insurgencies in India broadly 
fall into the following types:
those relating to the insurgency in Jammu •	
and Kashmir;
those related to the separatist movements in •	
North Eastern States;
violence perpetrated by left wing extremist •	
groups;
terrorist attacks in urban and semi urban •	
areas of India that are not obviously 
connected with the above three types.
By making a distinction between 
insurgencies and terrorist attacks this report 
addresses terrorist incidents in urban and semi 
urban areas of India. The Mumbai 1993 multiple 
bomb blast was the first incident of this kind. 
Since then several incidents have occurred in 
various parts of the country.
This report describes the efforts taken to 
build a data base of such incidents. Data for 
this purpose has been drawn from the English 
newspapers published in India.
The data base includes:
Name of the incident;
The date of the incident;
Location;
State; 
Special events associated with the date if any;
Type of attack;
Number of bombs;




Currently the incidents that occurred 
between 1993 and 2010 are included in this 
data base. There is also a provision to update 
this database.
Initial analysis of this data provides basic 
statistics on the terrorism problem. These 
statistics in conjunction with linked narratives 
on each of the incidents together provide a 
more comprehensive picture of how these 
attacks were planned, organized and executed. 
Although data on some of the variables is still 
missing, having a database of this type has 
many advantages. Using standard clustering 
algorithms it has been possible to group the 
incidents into ten clusters. These clusters are 
differentiated primarily by the bomb materials 
used, the delivery vehicles and whether the 
incidents are single or multiple bomb blasts.
The availability of such a database has 
also enabled us to carry out a spatial analysis 
of the bomb placements in the case of multiple 
bomb blast incidents. A preliminary analysis 
shows that in some of the incidents the 
bombs were placed randomly showing a lack 
of sophistication. In some cases the bombs 
were clustered while in some cases some 
amount of regularity is observed. This kind 
of analysis if carried out with complete data 
will help to classify the perpetrator groups in 
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terms of their organization capabilities and 
level of sophistication in carrying out such 
attacks.
Problems of linking terror attacks to 
geography and time along with clustering and 
spatial analysis may permit a more organized 
way to look for patterns in these attacks.
This is a preliminary report of the study 
carried out by the International Strategic and 
Security Studies Programme (ISSSP) of the 
National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) 
and brings into focus several questions that 
need to be addressed in order to understand the 
problem of terrorism in India. 
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1.0  Global Developments 
Research on terrorism across the world 
focus on the definitions of terrorism1, the 
history and culture of terrorism, trends in 
terrorism2, motivations of terrorist groups3, 
conflict situations that provoke terrorist acts, 
vulnerability and risk assessment,4 psychological 
and cognitive models to understand the making 
of a terrorist and measures to counter terrorism 
5,6. India has been a victim of some form of 
terrorism or the other since independence. 
It has been reported that for the period 1970 
- 2007 India ranks fourth among the most 
frequently attacked countries and third in terms 
of fatalities5. In spite of this, there has not been 
any effort to look at the problem quantitatively 
or make a quantitative assessment of the 
problem. The effort by Piazza6 is probably 
one of the few that has attempted to look at 
the problem of terrorism in India analytically. 
He has shown that terrorism is not necessarily 
due to poor economic development but is an 
outcome of unresolved and poorly managed 
political conflicts. Piazza’s analysis however, 
does not distinguish between terrorism and 
insurgencies.
The Policy Working Group7 on the United 
Nations and Terrorism in 2002 stated the following: 
“Without attempting a comprehensive definition 
of terrorism, it would be useful to delineate 
some broad characteristics of the phenomenon. 
Terrorism is, in most cases, essentially a political 
act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly 
injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere 
of fear, generally for a political or ideological 
(whether secular or religious) purpose. Terrorism 
is a criminal act, but it is more than mere 
criminality. To overcome the problem of terrorism 
it is necessary to understand its political nature as 
well as its basic criminality and psychology.”
4
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The document also refers to insurgency and 
points out how the two terms are different. “An 
insurgency differs from terrorism in the sense it 
is an organized revolt against the government or 
State with the purpose of acquiring some territory 
of land.” In many cases an insurgency is also a 
means to bring the state to the negotiation table.
For our purpose a terrorist incident 
is a planned and motivated act of violence 
using weapons of destruction against civilian 
population resulting in loss of life, damage 
to property by a person or a group with the 
intention of creating fear in a population and 
to ‘destabilize the state’. A communal riot 
which is more common in some parts of India is 
however not to be confused with a terrorist act. 
A communal riot is a violent confrontation of 
two groups belonging to two different religions 
or communities. This often results in loss of life 
and property. A communal riot is a spontaneous 
reaction to a conflict and is not pre- planned.
1.1 InDIa & terrorIsm
Unlike many other countries the problem 
of terrorism in India particularly after 
independence has several facets and exhibits 
an ever changing scenario. Some of the major 
terrorist / insurgency incidents that independent 
India has had to contend with include:
 The Kashmir insurgency;
 The Khalisthan movement;
 Naxalism and Maoist insurgency;
 Insurgency in the North Eastern States of 
India;
 LTTE related incidents in South India.
India has successfully dealt with 
insurgencies in Punjab, Nagaland, Mizoram and 
Tripura. It took 19 years to deal with the Naga 
insurgency and Mizo insurgencies, 14 years to 
deal with Khalisthan terrorism and 10 years 
to deal with Al Umma. India has succeeded 
whenever the terrorism or insurgency was 
confined to a narrow area. 
The International Strategic and Security 
Studies Programme (ISSSP) of the National 
Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) decided 
to initiate a study of terrorism following the 
Mumbai terrorist attack that took place on 
November 26, 2008. The primary objective was 
to understand the way the terrorist attacks were 
planned and executed. Though the attack had 
all the hallmarks of Pakistan’s involvement, it 
also raised a number of questions related to 
terrorism in India. Do all terrorist incidents 
emanate from outside? Are there entities within 
India also carrying out such acts on their own? 
Do they get outside support? We also needed 
to understand whether there was any similarity 
in the nature of attacks. As we were trying to 
grapple with these questions, it became evident 
that we needed a data base of all the incidents 
that have taken place in India. We also realized 
that such a data base is not available and has 
to be built from scratch. The initial focus of 
the work thus turned towards building such a 
database.
Currently, terrorism and insurgencies in 
India fall into four main types:
Those relating to the insurgency in Jammu •	
and Kashmir;
Those relating to the separatist movements •	
in North Eastern States;
Violence perpetrated by left wing extremist •	
groups;
Terrorist incidents in urban and semi urban •	
India that are not obviously connected with 
the above three types.
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1.2 scope
This report focuses exclusively on the last 
category. The incidents that we have covered 
do not fall into the category of an insurgency 
nor can they be classified as a communal riot. 
They are often given a religious overtone by 
the media. Many of these terrorist acts are also 
referred to as cross border terrorism since it is 
believed that these acts have been triggered 
by agencies outside the country. We have not 
separated out international terrorist attacks on 
India from those perpetrated by domestic terror 
groups, since it is difficult to get data on the 
terrorist groups located both within and outside 
the country. Many of the terrorist attacks are 
still under investigation. It is not the objective 
of this report to associate a terrorist incident 
with any specific group.
The Babri Masjid demolition on December 
6, 1992 in India was followed by widespread 
communal riots across the country. It is generally 
believed that the Mumbai blasts of March 12 
1993 were an aftermath of this. Since then 
several incidents have occurred in the country 
that have no relation to the insurgencies 
mentioned earlier.
This report tries to ask a number of 
questions based on the data base that has 
been built. As we look at the various terrorist 
incidents that have taken place in the country, 
we would like to know if there is any pattern 
in the “madness”. We would like to understand 
whether there has been any significant change 
in the targets chosen and in the kind of 
explosives used. We have tried to summarize 
some of our findings in this report. More 
detailed studies however need to be carried 
out. The report also suggests what could be the 
future areas of study.
This report does not attempt to draw any 
major conclusions because many of the data 
elements are incomplete for quite a few of 
the incidents. Data on terrorism in the public 
domain is sparse and agencies that probably 
have the data are rarely willing to share it 
with researchers. This has to change in India 
so that different aspects of the problem can be 
addressed by academia in the country.
6 NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
terroriSm data for reSearch
8 Schmid A P, The Challenge of measuring Trends in Global Terrorism, in Forum on Crime and Society, Vol. 4, Nos. 
1 & 2, Dec. 2004,  UN Office on Drugs and Crime, New York, 2005.
9 “Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed on  1, March 2011
10 The South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) – www.satp.org – was launched in 2000 and has data base on extremist 
events in the region. It is a project of the Institute for Conflict management, New Delhi, India.
2.0 neeD for creatInG a Data base 
There are not many data bases on terrorism. 
Even when they do exist they have both spatial 
and temporal gaps. Since there are differences 
in the way terrorism is defined, the entries in 
different data bases on the same incident also 
differ. These aspects of data bases and the 
utility of data bases have been examined by 
Schmid8 (2005). In recent years the Global 
Terrorism Data (GTD)9 maintained by the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism (START), a United 
States Department of Homeland Security 
Center of Excellence, located at the University 
of Maryland, has been building and maintaining 
a database on terrorisms incidents all over the 
world. However, even this data base on India 
is not complete. There are gaps on some of the 
variables of interest. Clearly, if any meaningful 
study on terrorism in India has to be made, the 
data base should necessarily be built in India. 
The authors of this paper realized that a data 
base of the kind amenable for analysis does not 
exist and has to be built from scratch from data 
available in the public domain.
Apart from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), the South Asian Terrorism Portal 
(SATP)10 has a list of terrorist incidents that 
occurred in India. The data primarily includes 
the date of the incident, the place where it 
occurred and the number killed and injured. 
Since we were interested in building a data base, 
we looked at the archives of National English 
Dailies published in India, using the dates of the 
incidents available in GTD and SATP as a guide 
for the search. More details about the incidents 
were thus collected from these newspaper 
articles and a few magazines such as India Today 
and Frontline. Even as we were collecting this 
data, several incidents that were not mentioned 
in either GTD or SATP surfaced. Some of them 
were not major incidents, but nevertheless 
important. Thus over a period of time we were 
able to list 62 incidents of this kind between 
March 1993 and December 2010.
Building this data base brought forth 
several problems. The very nature of terrorism 
introduces certain biases in reporting both in 
the print and visual media. In addition, the 
political aspects and dimensions during the time 
of the incident also colour the reporting. The 
location of the incident also has a significant 
role to play since incidents that occur in 
small towns may or may not get reported in 
major newspapers. Local Newspapers in the 
vernacular languages probably cover many of 
7NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
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Place Text Actual locations
Incident name Text Popular name for the incident
No. of Locations Integer
Target Binary
*Temple, Mosque, Train, Bazaar, Public Building, Government 
Building, Public place, Hospital, Monuments, Others
Day of week Text






Binary *Bomb blast, Grenade attack, Rifle attack, Incendiary attack.
No. of bombs Integer Range: 0 – total no. of bombs used
Bomb Material Text Describes the materials used
Packing Text Describes how the bomb was packed
Delivery 
method




*Bicycle, Two wheeler, Three wheeler, Four wheeler, Bus, Train, 
Human
Bomb-Trigger Text Describes the trigger mechanism used.
Perpetrator Text Name of the group claiming responsibility for the incident
Remarks Text Any additional data
Note: * For each incident 0 or 1 is assigned against these categories.
the incidents that go unreported in the major 
English Newspapers.
2.1 structure of the Data base
Our database includes items such as the 
name of the incident, the location, the State, 
the special events associated with the date if 
any, the type of attack and so on. The complete 
list of the fields for the data record is shown 
in Table 1. A comprehensive understanding 
of terrorism incidents and their inter linkages 
require descriptions of the actual incidents, the 
way they occurred etc. 
The original document from which the 
data has been collated is therefore important. 
In our data base these are hyperlinked to each 
of the incidents. Thus the data base includes all 
aspects of an incident. For some of the incidents 
data on some of the fields are not available. 
These can be filled out as and when the data 
becomes available.
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It is difficult to validate all the parameters 
in the data base. We are not aware whether there 
is any agency in the country that collects and 
puts together data on the terrorist incidents in 
this form to facilitate analysis. Nor do we believe 
that our list is exhaustive because our sources 
have been primarily from the English media. 
It is possible that some ‘small’ incidents could 
have been given wider coverage in a vernacular 
medium and we would have missed them.
9NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
data analySiS
11 Considering the fact that insurgencies are prevalent in the North Eastern States, Bihar, Orissa, Chattisgarh, Jammu 
& Kashmir and Jharkhand,  it is clear that almost all the states of India are victims of terrorism or insurgency
12 Incidentally there were records of 12 incidents in Delhi in 1997 which was not reported in any of our sources. If 
these incidents were also included, Delhi would have as many as 21 incidents during the study period, These 12 
incidents were however minor in the sense, they together resulted in fewer than 5 deaths.  Since no other data 
was available on these incidents these were not considered for our analysis.
3.0 the bIG pIcture
From March 12, 1993 till the end of 2010, 
62 incidents were recorded. A total of 1467 
persons were killed and 4497 persons were 
injured in these incidents. On an average 3.4 
incidents of this type have occurred annually in 
the country resulting in an average of 80 deaths 
per year. The incidents occurred in the states 
of Andhra Pradesh (A.P.), Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, 
Haryana, Karnataka, Jammu & Kashmir, 
Maharashtra, New Delhi, Punjab, Rajasthan, 
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and West 
Bengal (WB).11  
Delhi, Maharashtra and U.P. bore the brunt 
of the incidents with nearly 70% of the incidents 
occurring in these states.
The maximum number of incidents (18) 
occurred in Maharashtra resulting in more than 
700 deaths and leaving more than 2300 injured. 
This constitutes close to 50% of the total number 
of deaths due to such terrorist incidents in the 
country. 
Uttar Pradesh faced 14 incidents resulting 
in 100 deaths and 400 injured. New Delhi12 
which had fewer incidents (9) than UP had 
more casualties than UP. 
Figure 1 shows the number of incidents 
and the fatalities in different states during 
1993-2010. 
Figure 2 shows the cumulated number of 
incidents in Delhi, U.P and Maharashtra during 
the same period.
Although there were only 4 incidents 
in Gujarat, the casualties were as much as in 
UP suggesting that these incidents are ‘large 
scale operations’. Maharashtra, UP, New Delhi, 
Gujarat, AP, and Rajasthan have had the 
maximum casualties – close to 80% of the total 
casualties since 1993.
Haryana is not included here because the 
one incident that occurred in Haryana refers 
to the Samjauta express train blast. Though 
this occurred in Haryana the target was not 
necessarily the Haryana state or its people.
West Bengal had two incidents. The first 
occurred in Bow Bazaar which did result in 
massive deaths. However it is doubtful whether 
this was a pre-planned terrorist incident or not. 
The other incident on the American centre, 
Kolkata resulted in 9 deaths.
Figure 3 shows year wise statistics on the 
number of incidents. The figure shows that the 
10
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Figure 1 State wise No. of incidents, No. Killed and No. injured (1993 - 2010)
Figure 2 Cumulative Number of incidents in Delhi, Maharashtra and UP
11NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
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Figure 3 Year wise - Number of Incidents, Number Dead & Number Injured
maximum number of incidents occurred in 2007 
and 2008. In all 21 incidents out of a total 62 
incidents recorded occurred during this period. 
There is an increasing trend in the number of 
incidents. 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative number of 
incidents and fatalities during 1993 – 2010. The 
maximum number of incidents occurred in 2007 
and 2008. There is an increase in the number of 
incidents from 2000 onwards, the median year 
being 2005. The median year for the number 
of fatalities is also 2005. In other words 50% of 
the incidents and the fatalities occurred in the 
last five years. 
Between 1993 and 2005 the rate of increase 
in deaths has remained more or less constant. 
There is an increase in this rate between 2005 
and 2008. After 2008, we see that the curve has 
flattened off again. The cumulative curve for 
the number injured shows a sudden increase 
in the numbers in 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2008 
from the previous years. The maximum number 
of injuries occurred in 1993, 2006 and 2008. 
Since the data on the number injured is the most 
difficult to verify and validate, it is important to 
look at the trends rather than the values that 
are available.
Figure 5 shows the fatalities rate, and 
the rate of injuries per incident during the 
same period. The fatality rate ranges from 0 in 
2004 to 120 in 1993. The number injured per 
incident is the highest in 1993 and the lowest in 
2009. Although the number of deaths in 2008 
is as high as the number of deaths in 1993, the 
fatality rate does not show this, because there 
were more terrorist incidents in 2008 as against 
one incident in 1993.
Globally the average number of victims 
(this includes both the number dead and injured) 
per international terrorist attack for the periods 
12
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Figure 4 Cumulated Number of Incidents and Deaths (1993 – 2010)
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1990-1999 and 2000-2005 have been quoted to 
be 10.38 and 10.8913. For the same period, in 
India the numbers are 24.8 and 9.6. From our 
data we observe that for the period 2006 -2010, 
this has gone up to 19.2. Of course not all the 62 
incidents are international terrorist incidents. 
It is important to note that these numbers are 
not small and that the situation in India is both 
serious and grave.
3.1 GroupInG of the IncIDents
Not all incidents of terrorism have the same 
impact in terms of the number of victims and 
property loss. A careful scrutiny of the incidents 
shows that there are three types of incidents 
Those which are primarily attacks with rifles •	
or weapons;
Those which involve IEDs, explosives, bombs •	
etc.;
Those which involve rifle attacks as well as •	
explosives, bombs etc.
3.1.1 AttAcks with Rifles oR weApons
The attacks on Delhi Red Fort (2000), the 
Kashmir Assembly (2001), Parliament (2001), 
the American Centre,  Kolkata (2001), the 
Akshardham Temple in Gujarat (2002), the Ram 
Temple in UP (2005), IISc in Bangalore ( 2005) 
and the CRPF camp attack in UP (2008) are all 
attacks  that primarily used rifles or weapons. 
These constitute 12% of all incidents and 
resulted in less than 8% of the total casualties. 
The number injured in this kind of attack is 
close to 4% of all injured. 
A quick glance at these incidents show 
that the attacks on the Kashmir assembly the 
attack on Parliament in 2001, the attack on the 
American Centre again in 2001 and the CRPF 
camp attacks in UP in 2008 are clearly aimed 
at government establishments. The two attacks 
on temples in Gujarat and UP are attacks on 
religious establishments. The attack on Delhi 
Red Fort and the one at Indian Institute of 
Science, Bangalore created more panic and 
fewer deaths. 
Attacks of this kind are much more difficult 
to organize, because every one of these buildings 
or establishments is under high security. Persons 
willing to undertake such missions have to be 
highly motivated and trained to successfully 
carry out the attack.
3.1.2 Attacks involving Rifles and Bombs
On 26 November, 2008 there were more 
than ten attacks involving coordinated shooting 
and bombing across Mumbai. The attacks began 
on 26 November 2008 and lasted until 29 
November. The terrorists knew the city extremely 
well and had done a thorough reconnaissance 
of the area. The organization and planning 
was very meticulous and the terrorists carried 
sophisticated weapons and explosives. The skill 
with which the attack was carried out indicates 
that they were trained by experts. The terrorists 
were equipped with enough ammunition to 
carry out a major attack spanning several days.
The Mumbai 2008 incidents involved bombs, 
grenades as well as attacks with rifles and belongs 
14
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to the third category. This incident stands out 
since it resulted in 175 deaths and left at least 300 
injured. This single incident resulted in 12% of the 
total fatalities. Unlike the other attack incidents 
this incident was spread out spatially and involved 
multiple locations and targets.
3.1.3 AttAcks involving only BomBs And gRenAdes 
It is obvious that the primary objective 
of a terrorist group will be to cause maximum 
damage to the population, property and also 
create panic. Broadly one can assume the steps 
involved in planning and executing an attack 
will be as follows:
1. Select Target(s).
2. Survey around the target(s) to decide on 
the exact location of attack. This could 
eventually help the placement of a bomb.
3. Procure equipment, explosive materials.




Planning a terrorist attack involves 
decisions on the method of attack - weapons 
or bombs; explosive materials; making of a 
bomb with the material – including packing; 
trigger mechanism; delivery method; planning 
the locations and time of attack. One or more 
persons are required to lead and carry out such 
an operation. The total number of persons 
required to execute the attack increases with 
the complexity of operations. The organization 
and execution of major terrorist operations 
thus require complex human interactions and 
involve considerable training in every one of 
these operations. 
Depending on the availability of resources 
at any point of time, attacks are organized 
by a group of individuals. The availability 
of a particular type of explosives; the ability 
to assemble an explosive device; the choice 
of trigger mechanisms; the power source to 
trigger a device; the timing of the explosion are 
important elements in planning an attack. These 
elements are thus essentially the signatures of 
a particular group. Having a data base on all 
these elements for every incident of terrorism 
will help to identify these signatures which in 
turn may help to identify the possible groups.
Of the 62 incidents recorded in our data 
base, 51 incidents were bomb blasts; some of 
them single blasts and some were synchronized 
multiple or serial blasts.  There are similarities 
in the incidents with respect to the type of 
explosives used, the kind of delivery vehicles 
employed and other characteristics. The data 
base per se does not obviously show linkages 
or connections between incidents. This can be 
ascertained if we are able to decipher some 
patterns in the way the attacks have been 
planned and executed.  
There are a number of quantitative models 
that can be applied to this data base to identify 
the patterns. Clustering and Spatial Analysis of 
bomb placements in the case of multiple bomb 
blast incidents are useful to identify if there 
are any patterns in the way these attacks are 
planned and executed. While Clustering groups 
incidents that are similar, spatial analysis brings 
out the level of sophistication of the group that 
carries out multiple blasts. Broadly Clustering 
can be used to look for patterns in steps 3 and 
4 above. Spatial analysis of bomb placement 
will help bring out the patterns in Step 2 and 
provide a link to patterns in steps 3 and 4.
We demonstrate the application of both 
these methods using our data base. The results 
are discussed in the subsequent sections.
15NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
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3.2 Variables Used for Clustering the 
Incidents
Tools such as clustering algorithms could 
be used to group incidents that are similar and 
this would perhaps facilitate investigation.14 The 
present study demonstrates this using data on 
incidents of terrorism in India during the period 
1993 – 2010. The objective of clustering here is 
to assign incidents with similar characteristics 
to the same cluster and also distinguish it from 
incidents in other clusters. In order to do this we 
need to define variables that describe a terrorist 
incident. For the purpose of clustering, we 
define several variables to describe an incident 
from the data base that we had generated. 
Some of the variables are binary (Yes or No) 
and some of them are discrete. The variables 
chosen are:
The type of blast (serial or not);
The number of locations;
The number of bombs;
The explosive material used;
The non-explosive materials used;
The trigger mechanisms employed;
The type of packing;
The delivery vehicles used; 
The targets
Variables and their type derived from our 
data base are shown in Table 2. 
The blast types could be either a single 
blast or multiple blasts. This is described in 
terms of the number of bombs. For instance if 
the blast is not a serial blast and the number of 
bombs is more than one, it suggests that several 
bombs went off at the same location. For our 
purpose we would consider that bombs placed 
reasonably close by (say within a distance of a 
few meters) to be treated as the same location. 
In the case of multiple serial blasts, the number 
of locations and the number of bombs will be 
greater than one.
The explosive materials are many and what 
we have included in our data base is based on 
what has been observed in the incidents that 
occurred in India. In many of the incidents, the 
materials used are not known from available 
sources. In some incidents a combination of 
explosives were used. In other cases some kind 
of improvised devices were used suggesting 
a lack of sophistication in the planning of the 
attack.
The bomb making itself can be a very 
complex task. Materials like metal pieces, nails, 
cement chips etc. are packed along with the 
explosives to create more damage once the bomb 
goes off. Although this is not a very important 
signature of a group, the kind of materials used 
for packing does indicate whether the group is 
sophisticated or not. Perhaps it is also indicative 
of the kind of training that has been provided to 
the bomb maker.
The bombs are usually triggered with a 
remote device. These can be of different types. 
Some Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) use 
electrical firing cable which affords the user 
complete control over the device right up until 
the moment of initiation. There are IEDs which 
are triggered by radio signals. In this device, 
the receiver is connected to an electrical firing 
circuit and the transmitter operates from a 
remote distance. A signal from the transmitter 
causes the receiver to trigger a switch in the 
explosive device. This switch fires an initiator in 
16
PatternS in terror attackS in urban and Semi-urban india – an emPirical inveStigation
NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
Table 2 - Variables Defined for Clustering
Characteristic Variable Type Variable Type
Type of blast Serial Blast Yes-1, No-0 No. of Locations Numeric




RDX / Plastic explosive Yes-1, No-0 Potassium chlorate Yes-1, No-0
NaNO3 Yes-1, No-0









Metal pieces Type1 Yes-1, No-0 Nails / nut & bolts Yes-1, No-0
Ball bearings Yes-1, No-0 Cement chips Yes-1, No-0
Trigger 
mechanisms




Pipe Yes-1, No-0 Milk Container Yes-1, No-0
Tiffin Box Yes-1, No-0 Pressure cooker Yes-1, No-0
Bags / Briefcase Yes-1, No-0 Packing Paper Yes-1, No-0
Delivery 
Vehicles
Two / Three wheeler Yes-1, No-0 Car Yes-1, No-0
Hand Thrown Yes-1, No-0 Planted on site Yes-1, No-0
Targets Mosque Yes-1, No-0 Temple Yes-1, No-0
Train Yes-1, No-0 Public Building Yes-1, No-0
Government Building Yes-1, No-0 Monument Yes-1, No-0
Public Place / Market Yes-1, No-0 Private Building Yes-1, No-0
the device setting off the bomb. The transmitter 
and receiver operate on a matched coding system 
which prevents the IED from being initiated by 
spurious radio frequency signals. Such a device 
can be triggered using car alarms, cell phones 
and similar electronic devices. There are also 
occasions where the bomb went off while it was 
being assembled and this case is also included 
under trigger mechanism employed. In our data 
collection, detailed information on the trigger 
mechanism employed is not available in most of 
the cases. Therefore the number of categories is 
limited to three.
The methods used for packing the 
explosives are grouped under the category 
of type of packing. The number of categories 
we have included for our analysis is mainly 
based on what our data revealed. This is not 
an exhaustive list and there could be several 
other methods. Of these, the pipe bomb has 
been in wide use globally. A pipe filled with an 
explosive material tightly sealed on both ends is 
called a pipe bomb. The containment provided 
by the pipe allows use of easily available 
low explosives packed tightly to produce a 
reasonably large explosion. Pressure cooker 
bombs have also been found to be used in India, 
neighbouring countries as well as in Dresden, 
Germany in 2003. Other packing methods that 
have been used in India are also included under 
this category. Obviously, the explosives packed 
inside determine the lethality of the attack. 
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Some of the packing methods such as tiffin box, 
milk container and bags suggest crude planning 
and involvement of local groups.
The delivery vehicles used in carrying 
out the operation is a clear signature of the 
sophistication levels of the group. Here we have 
not included human bombs or suicide bombers 
as a category simply because such incidents 
have not been recorded in our data base. 
Target categories are necessarily broad 
and are sometimes not obvious and have to be 
surmised based on the location of the bomb. 
For the purpose of clustering however, 
not all these variables were included, because 
data on many of these variables was sparse. 
For instance very little data was available on 
the non-explosive materials and therefore was 
not included in the analysis. The data on the 
explosive materials used is not complete and 
hence some amount of overlap between the 
variables is bound to be there. In any case 
since one of the objectives of the paper is to 
demonstrate the use of clustering methods 
to bring out similarity between incidents, we 
have not attempted to refine the definition of 
variables. Agencies that have complete data on 
these aspects of terrorist incidents would be 
able to define the variables more precisely.
3.3 the clusters
Of the 53 incidents there were two involving 
the removal of fish plates on rail tracks and do not 
qualify to be in any of the three categories. The 
51 incidents that involved bombs and explosives 
are grouped using standard clustering algorithms 
and the variables mentioned in Table 2. There 
are several methods for clustering15 of which the 
hierarchical clustering method and the K-means 
clustering algorithm are well known. Since we 
did not have any idea about the number of 
clusters, we applied hierarchical clustering on 
the data. The process resulted in eight clusters. 
We then computed correlation matrix for the 51 
incidents. Using this as the similarity matrix the 
incidents were classified into 8 clusters using K- 
means clustering algorithm. The clusters and the 
incidents that fall in each of these clusters are 
shown in Table 3. The K-means clustering also 
provides data on the dominant characteristics 
of the cluster. This helps in understanding the 
clusters.
In some of the incidents in cluster 3 the 
materials used were not known. The common 
characteristics of cluster 3 were also not 
immediately apparent and therefore we decided 
to further cluster these incidents. These are 
shown as clusters 3/1, 3/2 and 3/3.
Cluster 1 includes incidents where the 
bombs were packed in pipes and hand thrown. 
A single bomb was thrown in all these cases. 
The Bow Bazaar incident in 1993 is slightly 
different. In this incident a blast occurred inside 
the basement of an apartment block where these 
explosives were stored, probably for later use. 
The Nanded incident also is a kind of an outlier 
because the blast went off when the bomb was 
being transported. The fatality rate of this cluster 
without the Bow Bazaar incident is small at 0.5.
Incidents where RDX / Plastic explosives 
have been used were grouped into 4 clusters. 
These are the clusters 2, 3, 4 and 8. RDX was 
used in 18 of the incidents. The fatality rates 
of these clusters vary from 7.3 in cluster 8 to 
68.0 in cluster 3/3. Obviously the making of the 
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Table 3 - Results of Cluster Analysis
Cluster Incident names Common Characteristics Remarks






Materials no data 
Hand Thrown 
Packed in Pipes 
Mosque attacks.
5 incidents
Fatality Rate : 0.5
without Bow 
Bazaar incident 
2 Lajpat Nagar 1996
Mumbai BEST 2002 
Mumbai local train 2003
Mumbai BEST 2003 
Jaunpur Train 2005 (UP) 
Ahmedabad Station 
2006 
Pune Bakery 2010 
Samjauta  Express 2007
Single Location
RDX /Amm. nitrate  
based 
Planted on site.
Pre-set and remote 
timers used.
No data on type of 
packing.
8 incidents
Fatality Rate : 16.1





Fatality Rate : 31.0
3 /1 Bangalore Cricket Stadium 
2010
McDonald Mumbai 2002 










Neogel / Fuel Oil
Fatality Rate: 11.8
3 /2 Ahmedabad Serial 2008
Coimbatore 1998
Bangalore serial blasts 2008




Pre-set / remote timers.
Amm. Nitrate / Neogel
Fatality Rate : 16.9
3 /3 Mumbai 1993 serial attack
Sadar Bazar Delhi 1996
Red Fort 2000
Vile Parle  2003
Delhi Markets 2005




RDX / Plastic 
explosives 
Gelatin, Sodium and 
Potassium derivatives.
Fatality Rate of 3/3: 
 68.0
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bombs itself is different in these cases as also 
the timing and location of the bombs. Cluster 
3/3 includes all the incidents which used 
multiple bombs in multiple locations. The Jaipur 
incident was a serial attack. Such incidents 
require complex planning and organization. 
They also require more people to carry out the 
attack. Groups responsible for such attacks also 
need to have considerable knowledge about the 
topography of the place and support from the 
local population. 
Cluster 3/2 includes incidents which used 
explosives based on Ammonium nitrate / Neogel. 
All the four incidents are serial blasts and used 
some form of pre-set or remote timers. The 
fatality rate was 16.9. The Bangalore incident 
was obviously not well planned and did not 
result in many casualties. Without this incident 
Cluster Incident names Common Characteristics Remarks
4 Lucknow 2007 
Varanasi 2007 
Faizabad 2007





RDX / Plastic 
explosives 
All used Ammonium  
Nitrate / Fuel oil 
Pre-set timer except 
Malegaon
Two and Three 
wheelers.
6 Incidents






Materials no data. 





Fatality Rate : 1.5
6 Kanpur 2008 (UP)
Saibaba temple 2002(AP) 
Mehrauli Market Delhi 2008
Single Location; 
Pre-set timers used. 
KCLO3 used.
3 Incidents
Fatality Rate : 2.0
7 Mumbai Trains 1993 (5nos.) 
Sabarmati Train 2000
Ghaziabad train 2001







Fatality Rate : 25.0
(based on 9 incidents) 
Nanded incident is an 
outlier.





All RDX and TNT 
Planted on site; 
Packed in Tiffin boxes.
3 Incidents
Fatality Rate : 7.3
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the fatality rate becomes 44.0 for this cluster. 
This cluster includes attacks which require very 
complex planning. All the incidents involving 
serial bombs attacks fall in either cluster 3/2 
or 3/316. However the explosive materials used 
in the two clusters differ. Cluster 3/1 includes 
some incidents that used Ammonium nitrate 
/ Neogel based explosives. All these incidents 
are characterized by multiple bombs in single 
locations. In many of the cases bombs placed on 
site did not go off, indicating that the planning 
and execution abilities of the group were not 
very good. In fact it has been reported that in 
the case of the Lumbini Park incident, 2 bombs 
went off killing 41 persons and later 19 bombs 
were defused around the same place.
In contrast in cluster 8, all the three 
incidents used RDX, planted in a single location. 
The impact was therefore less. In cluster 2 
although the fatality rate is 16, the major 
incident is Samjauta Express in 2007. Here, in 
addition to RDX, some fuel oil was also used. 
Without this incident, the fatality rate for this 
cluster works out to be 8.7.
In cluster 4 the characteristic feature is 
that two and three wheelers were used to plant 
the bombs. All the attacks used Ammonium 
Nitrate / Fuel oil based explosives. The incident 
in Margoa is perhaps an outlier here because 
the blast occurred when the bomb was being 
transported by two persons on a two wheeler.
Clusters 1, 5 and 7 include incidents where 
the bomb materials are not known. Cluster 5 
differs from cluster 1 in that some kind of 
timers was used here. Two and three wheelers 
were used as delivery vehicles. The fatality rate 
in these incidents was 1.5.
The fatality rate of the cluster 7 incidents 
is quite high at 25. All the incidents excepting 
the Nanded incident targeted trains. Of these, 
the Mumbai suburban rail incident in 2006 is 
significant because it was a serial blast. The 
Mumbai suburban rail incident alone resulted 
in more than 200 deaths. Without this incident 
the fatality rate for this cluster becomes 2.0. The 
high fatality rate can be attributed primarily to 
the large number of persons travelling in the 
train at the time of blast. The choice of the 
trains and the timing clearly indicates that the 
perpetrators planned the attack so that it will 
have maximum impact. Targeting a train is 
easier in India as compared to targeting a plane 
where generally the security measures are much 
more stringent. 
In the case of cluster 6 the fatality rate 
is 2.0. Pre-set timers were used and the data 
available to us indicate that KClO3 was one of 
the ingredients of the explosives.
Eleven incidents belonging to clusters 1, 5 
and 6 are minor incidents.
3.4 IncIDents InvolvInG serIal multIple 
blasts
A careful scrutiny of the clusters shows 
that the clusters 2 and 3 include most of the 
major incidents that occurred in India during 
the period 1993 – 2010. Cluster 3 includes all 
the serial blasts that occurred in the country. 
Table 4 shows the list of 10 major incidents 
in the country arranged in descending order 
of lethality. Except for the Samjauta Express 
and the Bow Bazaar episodes all other 
incidents involved multiple serial blasts. In 
the Ahmedabad incident as many as 21 bombs 
16 The only exception being the Mumbai suburban rail attack in 2006 which falls in cluster 7. This is because for this 
incident, the material used  is not known. Many of the data elements are missing for this incident.
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Table 4 - Major incidents during 1993 - 2010




Type of incident Material used Target










Mumbai 2008 10 175 Serial bombs Attack 











Jaipur 2008 9 63 Serial bombs RDX, Neogel Market places 
and temples
Delhi 2005 3 61 Serial bombs RDX Markets
Bow Bazaar 1993 1 60 Single Not Known Explosives 
stored 
Ahmedabad 2008 21 56 Serial bombs Ammonium 
Nitrate
Public places
Mumbai 2003 2 52 Serial bombs RDX Public Places
Coimbatore 1998 13 58 Serial Bombs Gelatin Sticks Public Places
went off at various locations causing close to 
60 deaths. The number of bombs used in the 
1993 incident in Mumbai was 13, leading to 
257 deaths. The materials used in each of these 
cases obviously determined the lethality and 
the extent of damage. While in the Ahmedabad 
case the explosives were mostly Ammonium 
nitrate based, RDX was used in the 1993 
Mumbai incidents. There were two more serial 
bomb blasts in 2008, one in Delhi and the other 
in Bangalore. 
Materials used in these major incidents 
include mainly RDX, Ammonium nitrate, 
Neogel, Fuel oils and Gelatin sticks. Clearly the 
multiple bomb blasts require elaborate planning 
and organization. The number of persons that 
need to be mobilized and trained to carry out 
such operations will increase with the number 
of locations and the spacing between them. 
Obviously such incidents cannot be organized 
quickly. So these incidents are usually not 
immediate retaliation to other events. Also, 
they need not be retaliatory events to incidents 
happening in the same region, state or city. 
It is therefore difficult to find linkages in the 
incidents happening in the vicinity of a terrorist 
event. In other words, it is not possible to 
identify triggering events for each of these serial 
blasts. Nevertheless one hears about a particular 
terrorist group claiming responsibility for an 
incident and giving reasons for the attack.
In the following sections we give a brief 
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summary of the serial blast events and in the 
section following that we describe the spatial 
distribution of the bomb locations in terms of the 
Ripley’s K function, a very commonly used tool 
to determine whether the spatial distributions 
are random or clustered. Since serial blasts 
require considerable planning and are difficult 
to execute, most of the time. It is important to 
understand each of these serial incidents in 
greater detail.
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underStanding Serial blaStS
17 Black Friday, S Hussain Zaidi, (2003),  Penguin Books India
4.0 mumbaI serIal blasts 1993
On 12 March 1993 starting from 13.28 
hours and lasting for two hours and more, a 
series of 13 bombs exploded in Mumbai which 
killed 257 persons and injured 713 people.  The 
attacks were said to be in retaliation for the wide 
spread Hindu-Muslim riots in Mumbai during 
December 1992 and January 1993 following 
the 6th December 1992 demolition of the Babri 
Masjid in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. RDX was used 
in bomb making with pencil timers as detonators. 
Gelatin sticks and grenades were also used. The 
plan17 involved planting time bombs at Air India, 
the Oil Refinery, Share Bazar, Gold Market, 5 Star 
Hotels, Movie Houses, Sena Bhavan, throwing 
hand grenades at the airport to destroy airplanes 
and Machhimar Colony at Mahim and storm 
the Bombay Muncipal Corporation (BMC) and 
Mantralaya with AK 56 rifles and shoot down 
the important leaders. However, the storming 
of the Mantralaya with the attack weapons was 
not carried out. The distribution of the bombs is 
shown in Figure 6.
4.1 coImbatore serIal blasts 1998
The incident occurred on Saturday, 14 
Feb. 1998 from 15.50 to 16.40 hours. Thirteen 
bombs exploded in 11 places within a 12 km 
radius. 58 persons were killed and 200 people 
injured. The blasts are said to be in retaliation 
Figure 6 Locations of Bombs in Mumbai 1993 Blast
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Figure 7 The Distribution of Bombs in the Coimbatore 1996 Incident
to the November 29 to December 1 1997 clashes 
between Hindu groups and Fundamental 
Muslim groups following the murder of a 
traffic policeman that resulted in the death of 
18 Muslims, two Hindus and the destruction of 
property worth crores of rupees.
The first bomb exploded at 15.50 hours 
on the Shanmugam Road in R S Puram, 100 
metres from the venue of the election meeting 
that was to be addressed by the BJP President 
L K Advani. Figure 7 shows the distribution 
of these bombs. 
Locations where the bombs exploded 
include:
Shanmugam Road, RS Puram1. 
Near Central Bus Stand2. 
Near Coimbatore Medical College Hospital3. 
Gani Rauther Street, Ukkadam area4. 
Vehicle parking lot at the Coimbatore 5. 
Junction Railway Station
Commercial complex near the Main bus 6. 
stand at Gandhipuram
A Travel Agency (owned by a local BJP 7. 
leader) on V K K Menon  Road
Textile showroom on Big Bazaar Street8. 
Sambandhapuram Junction9. 
A Jewellery showroom on Oppanakara 10. 
Street
The explosives used in the blasts were 
gelatin sticks activated by timer devices. Bombs 
were concealed in Cars, Motorcycles, Bicycles, 
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the side boxes of two wheelers, denim and rexin 
bags and in one case a cart loaded in pineapples. 
Several bombs that failed to detonate were 
defused. A car laden with 70 kg of explosives 
discovered on East Lokamanya Street behind 
the famous Annapoorna Hotel in R S Puram 
close to the BJP meeting venue was defused.
Large quantities of gelatin sticks, petrol 
bombs, pipe bombs, detonators, knives, swords, 
pick axes and sickles, apart from batteries and 
wires were seized by police.
4.2 new DelhI blasts 2005
A major bomb blast took place in New Delhi 
on Saturday, 29 October, 2005. The first blast 
took place at 17.38 hours in the main bazaar of 
Paharganj near the Delhi Railway Station. 18 
people died and 60 were injured in the blast.  The 
second blast took place at 18.00 hours inside a 
DTC bus in Govindpuri in the southern part of the 
city. The third blast took place at 18.05 hours 
in South Delhi’s busy Sarojini Nagar market. RDX 
was used in all the blasts.
In the first blast the bomb was planted 
in a two wheeler.  When the bomb exploded, 
it ripped apart a shop outside which the two-
wheeler was parked. A large number of people 
were assembled in the bazaar area resulting in 
the high number of deaths.
In the second blast the conductor of the 
bus spotted a suspicious plastic bag which 
none of the passenger claimed.  The driver 
and conductor of the bus quickly alerted the 
passengers and asked them to quickly get down 
the bus and thus minimised the damage. When 
the bomb was thrown out of the window of the 
bus and it exploded. 4 people were injured. The 
bomb was operated by an electronic device.
In the third blast a bomb exploded in a very 
crowded corner of the busy Sarojini market. 
The bomb was placed in a white Maruti van. 
The bomb went off near a vendor using a gas 
cylinder, which exploded, triggering multiple 
explosions leading to an outbreak of fire in 
a row of shops.  43 people died and 28 were 
injured. 
4.3 mumbaI suburban raIl serIal blasts 
2006
7 blasts rocked suburban trains in Mumbai 
during after work rush hour on Tuesday, the 11 
July 2006 between 18.24 and 18.35 hours. 
The locations are shown in Figure 8.
4.4 JaIpur blasts 2008
A series of bomb blasts took place in Jaipur 
on Tuesday, 13 May 2008. Eight explosions 
occurred in quick succession from 7.25 p.m. to 
7.45 p.m. All the bombs were placed in bicycles 
parked at the sites.
The distribution of the bombs is shown in 
Figure 9. The bombs went off in the crowded 
market districts of Tripolia Bazar, Johari Bazar, 
Manas Chowk, Badi Choupat and Choti Choupat. 
Two of the blasts occurred outside Hindu temples 
at Sanganeri Gate and Chandpole. Another took 
place in the vicinity of the renowned Hawa 
Mahal, a popular tourist attraction. 75 persons 
were killed from the bombings and over 150 
were injured. RDX and Ammonium nitrate 
were used to make the bombs. The bombs were 
packed with metal splinters or ball bearings to 
maximize damage in crowded areas.
4.5 Bangalore Serial Blast 2008
The Bangalore incident occurred on Friday 
the 25th July 2008. A series of low intensity 
blasts rocked the southern and central parts of 
Bangalore. One person was killed and seven 
were injured in the eight explosions. It started 
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Figure 8 Locations of Bomb Blasts in the Mumbai Suburban Rail 2006
Figure 9 The Distribution of Bombs in the Jaipur 2008 Incident
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Figure 10 Locations of Bomb Sites in the Bangalore 2008 Incident
at 13.15 hours and lasted for a period of 45 
minutes. 
The timeline of the blast sequence 
and their location is provided below.
Improvised Explosive Devices fitted to timer 
devices were used in the explosions.  Ammonium 
nitrate, bolts and nuts and cement chips were 
packed into the device.  Embedded chips were 
used as a timer to trigger the explosions. The 
sequence of the blasts were as follows :
1st blast: 1.20 pm, Madiwala bus depot.•	
2nd blast: 1.25 pm, Mysore road, under a •	
power transformer near a mall, one near 
a storm water drain and third near a car 
showroom next to the RTO.
3rd blast: 1.40 pm, Adugudi,  behind a •	
telephone junction box near a commercial 
complex.
4th blast: 2.10 pm, Koramangala.•	
5th blast: 2.25 pm, Vittal Mallya Road.•	
6th blast: 2.35 pm, Langford Town.•	
7th blast: Richmond Town. •	
There was another Bomb found on the 
26th July 2008 in Bangalore near Koramangala 
Forum Mall which was defused successfully by 
the Bomb Detection Squad.
4.6 ahmeDabaD serIal blasts 2008
The Ahmedabad bomb blast occurred on 
Saturday, the 26 July 2008. A day after blasts 
in Bangalore, 21 bomb blasts took place within 
a span of 70 minutes which killed 56 persons 
and injured 200 persons.
The first blast took place at 18.45 hours in 
13 places. 12 minutes later at 18.57 hours blasts 
occurred at eight other places. The blasts were of 
low intensity and similar to Bangalore blasts. 
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Figure 11 Locations of Bombs in the Ahmedabad 2008 blasts
Bombs were planted in tiffin carriers on 
bicycles, a pattern similar to 13 May 2008 
Jaipur blasts. Many blasts targeted the city bus 
service and ripped apart the vehicles.
2 bombs inside the premises of two hospitals, 
1 bomb from Hatkeswar area, and 2 bombs from 
Maninagar (Chief Minister Narendra Modi’s 
constituency) were found and defused.
Following are the places where the blasts 
took place:
1. Maninagar 9. Ishanpur
2. Hathkeshwar 10. Saraspur
3. Bapunagar 11. Raipur
4. Amraiwadi 12. Sarkhej
5. Govindwadi 13. Juhapura
6. Sarangpur 14. Civil Hospital
7. Jawaharchowk 15. L. G. Hospital 
8. Narol
2 cars, both stolen were found in Surat. 
One of the cars had four live bombs which 
were defused. In addition, a wooden box with 
white powder, wires, a battery and shrapnel 
were found near Nupur hospital. The cars were 
stolen from Navi Mumbai and subsequently 
filled with explosives at Vadodara.
Just days after the Ahmedabad blasts, 
another bomb was found near an electricity 
transmitter and contained a packet of 700-
800 grams of Ammonium Nitrate, a packet 
of shrapnel, 2 detonators, one battery and a 
circuit.
On 29 July 2008, 18 bombs were found 
in Surat in the diamond processing residential 
areas within a span of just 4 hours and 23 bombs 
were found in Surat in three days. Forensic 
investigations revealed that the bombs did not 
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explode because the circuits had been wrongly 
assembled.
4.7 new DelhI serIal blasts 2008
A series of five blasts exploded in the busy 
market places of New Delhi within a span 
of few minutes from 18.10 to 18.40 hours, in 
which 20 were killed and 100 injured. The 
incident occurred on Saturday the 13 Sept. 
2008. The first explosion took place at Karol 
Bagh, two were triggered at Connaught place 
and two more in the bustling M-Block market 
of Greater Kailash. The initial investigations 
have revealed that IED’s were configured with 
Ammonium nitrate and timer devices were used 
for timing the explosions. One live bomb was 
found at Connaught place, and two more at 
Central Park and at India Gate.
The first blast took place at 18.10 hours •	
at Gaffar Market area of Karol Bagh. The 
bomb was kept in or near a three wheeler 
(autorickshaw).
A bomb was kept in a dustbin near Gate •	
No.1 of the Barakambha Road Metro station 
in Connaught Place which went off at 18.35 
hours.
A bomb was kept in a bin in Central Park •	
and exploded at 18.40 hours.
Two low intensity bombs planted in a •	
dustbin and on a cycle in the busy M – Block 
market of Greater Kailash. They went off at 
18.30 and 18.40 hours.
A bomb was found in a dustbin outside •	
Regal Cinema in Connaught Place and was 
defused.
The IED’s used in the Delhi blast were similar 
to those used in the recent explosions in Jaipur, 
Bangalore and Ahmedabad. Readily available 
clocks were used to set the time for the blasts.
4.8 mumbaI serIal attack 2008
On November 26, 2008, attacks were 
carried out by multiple teams on locations 
where the citizens of Mumbai as well as foreign 
nationals move around or stay.  The attacks 
were launched through the indiscriminate and 
random firing from AK-47 assault rifles and 
lobbing lethal hand grenades. RDX based IED’s 
were planted in 2 taxis in which the terrorists 
travelled and others in the places of attack. The 
heavily armed terrorists took over buildings 
as hostages, indulged in drive-by shootings 
in sequential and simultaneous attacks. It is 
believed that ten perpetrators were involved 
divided into 5 batches of two each. Each of them 
had one 8 - 10 kg RDX laden IED and grenades 
and AK-47 assault rifles. In all ten bombs went 
off at various places. These were accompanied 
by attacks with grenades and AK 47 rifles at 
various places. 
Figure 12 provides the locations of the 
attacks carried out in 2008. The attacks were 
conducted with military precision and commando 
like action with detailed and meticulous planning. 
The perpetrators had familiarity and dexterity 
in the handling of sophisticated weapons and 
electronic equipment. This shows that they were 
professionally trained. They were trained for 
physical fitness, swimming, weapon handling, 
tradecraft, battle inoculation, guerilla warfare, 
firing sophisticated assault weapons, use of hand 
grenades and rocket launchers, handing of GPS 
and satellite phone, map reading etc. 
Figure 13 compares the locations of 
the bombs in the 1993 and 2008 attacks. It is 
interesting to trace the way the serial blasts 
have been organized since 1993 to understand 
whether there has been any major changes 
in the materials used, actual planting of the 
bombs, selection of the locations etc.  The data 
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Figure 13 Locations of bombs in Mumbai 1993 and Mumbai 2008 Blasts
Figure 12 Locations of Bombs in Mumbai 2008 Attack
on the materials used is not complete but it 
reveals some interesting facts. The explosives 
used in most of the incidents were either RDX 
or Ammonium Nitrate. In the Mumbai blast 
of 1993 RDX was used. After that incident, 
RDX came into use in 1996 and then in 2001. 
Since 2001 RDX has been used in as many as 
19 incidents. It is also interesting to note that 
ammonium nitrate was used for the first time 
in 2003. Since then this has been used in 17 
incidents. What is interesting to observe is 
the fact that while RDX is a difficult material 
to procure and Ammonium nitrate is probably 
the easiest to get, both these materials have 
been used as explosive material by the terrorist 
groups. In many cases ammonium nitrate is 
used together with other materials such as 
potassium chlorate and TNT. In the year 2007, 
there were 6 incidents that used RDX and 5 that 
used Ammonium nitrate.
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5.0 can spatIal analysIs help?
A terrorist group capable of carrying 
out multiple serial blasts definitely displays 
a higher level of organizing capability than a 
group that carries out a single bomb blast. The 
financial and human resources available to the 
former group are also high. In our analysis we 
have seen that as many as eight incidents were 
multiple bomb blasts. The materials used in 
these incidents were different, the impact was 
different and the motivations for carrying out 
such attacks are also not obviously evident.
If one looks at the way the bombs were 
dispersed in the area of attack, we see different 
patterns. A simple visual analysis seems to 
suggest that the locations have been chosen 
after a lot of thought. Is it really the case? 
Are these locations associated with proximity 
to other specific features of interest, such as 
transport arteries, monuments, commercial 
establishments etc.?  Even before we try to 
answer such questions, we need to determine 
whether the bombs are located randomly in the 
area or not.
Data in the form of a set of points, 
irregularly distributed within a region of space, 
arise in many different contexts; examples 
include locations of trees in a forest, of nests of 
birds. We call any such data-set a spatial point 
pattern and refer to the locations as events. 
Point pattern analysis looks for patterns in the 
spatial location of events.
Spatial point pattern analysis based on 
functions such as Ripley’s K function allows 
us to answer questions such as – Are the 
distribution of the location of bombs random 
in the sense of completely spatial random18 
(CSR)? If they are not random, are they 
regular or clustered?
Understanding this pattern helps us to 
assess the capability of the group. A sophisticated 
group would not place the bombs randomly. 
Placing the bombs regularly implies either 
the group knows the locality well and finds it 
advantageous to place them in that fashion. 
Depending on the chosen area bombs may 
be placed at regular intervals. In most of the 
multiple bomb blast cases, it can be expected 
that the bombs will be located at strategic 
locations where it will cause maximum damage 
or impact. One could also expect some form of 
clustering or aggregation in this case.
Predominantly spatial point pattern 
analysis has been carried out to understand 
naturally occurring phenomenon such as plant 
species distribution or earth quake epicentres. 
There have been a few studies where the patterns 
of industrial clusters in an urban environment 
SPatial analySiS of Serial bomb blaStS
18 Complete spatial randomness (CSR) describes a point process whereby point events occur within a given study 
area in a completely random fashion. This is also called a spatial Poisson process. The hypothesis of complete 
spatial randomness for a spatial point pattern asserts that: the number of events in any region follows a Poisson 
distribution with given mean count per uniform subdivision.. 
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have also been studied19,20. Spatial analysis of 
crimes21 and their locations is commonly used 
to identify ‘Hot spots’ of crimes. This kind of 
analysis is easier with the availability of software 
such as Crimestat22.
The effect of the serial bomb blasts have 
not been the same across the country. Apart 
from the materials used, the way the bombs are 
packed, the locations and the distribution of the 
bombs also indicate the nature of planning and 
the organization ability of the terrorist group. We 
note that the distributions of the bomb locations 
are not similar in these multiple blast incidents. 
This is also evident in the differential impact of 
these incidents. For instance, in the Bangalore 
incident of 2008, although bombs were placed 
in 7 locations, it did not have serious impact as 
compared to the Coimbatore incident of 1998. 
Spatial distribution of the bomb locations 
determines the intensity of the terrorist attack. 
In a multiple bomb blast, the choice of locations 
will indicate whether they are well planned or 
not. In a well-planned attack for instance, the 
perpetrator would have studied the impact area 
carefully and also worked out the placement of 
the bombs. In other words, the bombs will not 
be placed haphazardly. In this case the persons 
employed to place the bombs will not have 
much freedom. He or she is employed only to 
place it at a pre-determined place. This also 
means that the number of persons involved in 
such an operation will increase with the number 
of bombs and the number of locations. On the 
other hand in operations that are not so well-
planned, the placement of the bombs would be 
haphazard. We demonstrate the use of spatial 
point pattern analysis for the four incidents – 
Mumbai 1993, Jaipur 2008, Bangalore 2008 
and Ahmedabad 2008.
The Cluster analysis discussed earlier was 
able to group incidents which are similar in 
terms of the type of materials used, number of 
bombs, and other factors. In fact all the multiple 
bomb blast incidents fell into the same cluster. 
Even among these multiple incidents which are 
in cluster 3 the differing fatality rate indicates 
that there are differences in the organization 
and planning process of the incidents. It is in 
this context that the spatial analysis of the bomb 
placements becomes relevant.
5.1 choosInG the IncIDents for spatIal 
analysIs
We have selected four incidents to illustrate 
the method of spatial analysis. Table 5 provides 
the basic data for comparing these incidents.
There are apparent differences in these 
incidents. For example, the Mumbai blast in 
1993 and the Ahmedabad blast in 2008 involved 
multiple blasts. Though the areas of operation 
in both the incidents were of the same order, 
the number of bombs was larger in the case 
of Ahmedabad (Table 5). The incident lasted 
for as much as 2 hours in the Mumbai case 
19 Joseph Wartman and  Nicholas E. Malasavage, Spatial Analysis for Identifying Concentrations of Urban Damage, 
Ch. 7  in Methods and Techniques in Urban Engineering, Armando Carlos de Pina Filho and Aloisio Carlos de Pina 
(Ed.), InTech publisherers, 2010
20 Barff R.A. Industrial clustering and the Organization of Production: A Point pattern analysis of manufacturing in 
Cincinnati, Ohio, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 77 (1), pp 89 – 103, 1987.
21 Anselin L,  Cohen J, Cook D, Gorr W, and  Tita G, Spatial Analyses of Crime, in Criminal justice 2000, Vol. 4, pp. 
213-262.
22 See the link http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/CrimeStat/ for more details. This software was developed  by Ned 
Levine and associates.
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while it lasted for only 10 minutes in the case 
of Ahmedabad. It appears that the Ahmedabad 
incident is more sophisticated in operation 
and must have required greater planning 
effort, simply because of the number of people 
involved. Note however, that the number killed 
were not as many as in the Mumbai case. Two 
main reasons could be attributed to this: (i) the 
bomb materials were different (ii) the location 
of bombs. 
Similar comparisons can be made between 
the Bangalore 2008 serial blast and the Jaipur 
2008 serial blast. Both lasted for more or less 
the same duration and again the bomb material 
used and the location of the bombs made all the 
difference in the number of fatalities. 
While the clustering discussed earlier 
did bring out the difference in the materials 
used and other aspects, it did not take into 
account the spatial distribution of the bombs. 
At one level the complexity of operations are 
brought out by the different clusters. Another 
way to look at the sophistication involved in 
planning and executing these incidents would 
be to look at the placement of bombs. It is for 
this reason that the spatial analysis becomes 
important.
Table 5 - Characteristics of the Four Multiple Blast Incidents
Incident Name No. of Bombs  
(Duration Minutes)




Ahmedabad  2008 21 (10) 15 (301) 3 / 2  (57)
Mumbai 1993 13 (122) 13 (290) 3 / 3  (257)
Jaipur 2008 9 (20) 7 (4) 3 / 3  (63)
Bangalore 2008 9 (20) 7 (48) 3 / 2  (2)
5.2 rIpley k approach to spatIal pattern 
analysIs
Annexure 1 provides a brief introduction 
to the Ripley K approach to spatial pattern 
analysis. For our purpose, the locations of 
the bombs in a multiple serial bomb incident 
constitute a spatial point pattern. In our analysis, 
we treat the study area as a plane (although we 
do know that the earth is not a plane) since the 
area of interest is not very large. The precise 
locations of the bombs are not known to us, but 
we do know the general location.
We had earlier mapped these locations on 
to a Google earth image of the relevant area. 
Figures 6, 9, 10 and 11 illustrate this. 
The analysis involves calculation of K (r) 
or L(r)23	and	comparing	it	with	πr2 for various 
values of r.
If the events are Completely Spatially 
Random (CSR) Ripley’s K function K (r) 
= πr2
If the events are regularly spaced 
Ripley’s K function K (r) will be less 
than πr2 and 
If the events are clustered or 
aggregated Ripley’s K function K (r) will 
be greater than πr2
23 Ripley’s K function analyses the spatial distribution of points or events in space in terms of the distance between 
the points or distances in an area A. Crudely put, the function K (r) is a measure of the average number of events 
within a distance r normalized by λ, the number of events per unit area. If there are n events distributed in area 
A, then λ = n/A .  Usually L(r) which is a transformation of K (r) is computed and plotted against the distance r 
for ease of interpretation.
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If we use L (r) instead of K (r) as we have 
done the conditions are as follows:
If L (r )  = 0, the points are CSR; 
If L ( r )  > 0, the points are said to 
be clustered or aggregated
If L( r ) < 0, the distribution of 
points are regular. 
In some of the cases the number of bombs 
is greater than the number of locations. For 
instance, in the case of Ahmedabad 21 bombs 
went off in 15 locations. We have the data on 
the 15 locations but we do not know where 
multiple bombs were placed. Hence our spatial 
data shows only the fifteen locations. Similar is 
the case in Jaipur. With the exact data on all 
the bomb locations, analysis of this kind will be 
more meaningful.
The L functions for the Mumbai 1993 and 




In the case of Mumbai the study area is 
linear over a distance of 12 Kms. The spatial 
distribution of the bomb locations in this case 
appears to be clustered at a scale of 1 Km and 
above. It also appears that there are probably 
2 to 3 clusters since there are that many peaks. 
In the image showing the locations we see 
that there are clearly three clusters. Two of 
the clusters have points that are 1 Km. apart 
and in the other cluster the points are more 
closely placed. One can associate these clusters 
with Commercial, Political and Infrastructure 
activity.
In the case of Ahmedabad incident, some 
amount of regularity is indicated at smaller 
distances (< 2 Km) and clustering at higher 
scales. If we look carefully, we see two peaks 
suggesting two clusters. The spatial distribution 
of the points in the case of Ahmedabad (See 
Figure 11) suggests this. There is regularity 
within each cluster – the clusters separated by a 
Figure 14 L Function for Mumbai 1993 and Ahmedabad 2008 Serial blasts
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Figure 15 L Function for Jaipur 2008 and Bangalore 2008 Serial Blasts
river. The points are on either side of the river. 
In the case of the Ahmedabad 2008 incident, 
which occurred the day after the Bangalore 
incident as many as 21 bomb blasts occurred 
within a span of 15 minutes at 15 different 
locations. Some of them are believed to be 
simultaneous although it is not known in what 
sequence the blasts occurred. At the outset, 
it appears that there are four clusters. But, if 
we look carefully, there are only two clusters. 
In fact if one looks at the distribution of the 
bombs, most of them were concentrated in the 
Mani Nagar area which is one of the developed 
localities in Ahmedabad and is also believed to 
have a cosmopolitan population. Since as many 
as 21 bombs were placed, the number of persons 
involved was at least twice this number, just 
for bomb placements. If the number of bombs 
that did not go off was added to this we have 
to conclude that a terrorist group carrying out 
such an operation has to be well organized in 
order to be successful.
However, in this case, the number of deaths 
was not as large as compared to the Mumbai 
1993 blasts. This may be attributed partly to 
the materials used. It also suggests that maybe 
the planning was not very good in this case. 
It is also possible that the persons involved in 
placing the bombs were not adequately trained. 
Obviously a serial bomb blast involving as many 
as 20 or more bombs requires a lot of planning 
and organization in order to have the required 
impact. This requires considerable amount of 
training in bomb making and also knowledge 
of the city where the attack is planned. In 
fact support from the local population is very 
essential for this. The Ahmedabad incident seems 
to suggest that either this local knowledge was 
lacking in the terrorist group or that the attack 
had to be organized and executed in a hurry. 
Figure 15 shows the L function for Jaipur 
and Bangalore 2008. In the case of Jaipur, 
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regularity is obvious. In fact if we look at the 
image, we observe that the bombs were placed 
linearly along the road at regular intervals. There 
is no clustering in the placement of bombs. The 
broad area of operation was probably decided 
first and within that area they were probably 
dispersed according to convenience. The total 
area of operation was little more than 4.0 Sq. 
Km.
In the case of Bangalore, the picture is 
different. We see regularity at small scales up 
to 1.5 Km, and clustering at higher scales. The 
analysis for the Bangalore 2008 incident brings 
out a different result. The total area of operation 
was large, as much as 50 Sq. Km. Some of the 
points are clustered at distances of 1.75 Km to 
2.75 Km. There is also a suggestion of regularity 
at distances of 0.75 Km as shown by the troughs 
below the X axis. However, the operation itself 
was not very successful primarily because of the 
way the bombs were distributed. In that sense 
it was not a very well planned attack. This is 
however, different from the Ahmedabad case. 
The area of operation in the case of Bangalore 
is smaller than that of Ahmedabad.
If we consider the loss of lives as a measure 
of impact and the level of sophistication, we 
observe that Mumbai 1993 incident has been 
the most devastating. As the L function indicates 
there are three clusters which are spatially 
separated. In the case of Jaipur, the loss is 
more than that of Ahmedabad even though 
fewer bombs were used in Jaipur - nine in 
Jaipur as against 21 in Ahmedabad. The spatial 
distribution of the bombs is regular in Jaipur. 
The area of operation is densely populated in 
Jaipur at the time of the blast. Added to this 
is the use of RDX for the purpose. All these 
suggest that the group responsible for this act 
must have been quite familiar with Jaipur.
In the case of Ahmedabad, the spatial 
distribution is clustered and regular within 
the cluster. However, considering the fact 
that 21 bombs were used, the impact was not 
significant. This could also be attributed to the 
material used. It is believed that the explosives 
were Ammonium nitrate based. We also need 
to keep in mind here that as many as 9 bombs 
were defused in Ahmedabad the following day. 
Since we do not have the data on the location of 
these bombs, they were not considered for the 
spatial analysis. Ideally these locations should 
also be included for getting the correct picture.
We note that the Bangalore 2008 incident 
resulted in the loss of one life. The spatial 
distribution of the bombs does not show any 
sophistication. The timings of the bomb blast 
also indicated a lack of planning.
Spatial analysis of this kind would be 
useful to ascertain whether there is a similar 
pattern in the bomb distribution. Of course 
the distribution of the bombs will have to be 
different in different cities. It will depend 
on the distribution of population, the kind of 
targets chosen and the materials available for 
making the bombs. The spatial distribution 
also motivates us to ask the question why these 
bombs were placed in a particular manner. 
Would the impact be different if the distribution 
was modified? Is it possible to do this kind of 
analysis? More importantly, if the bombs were 
placed randomly what would have been the 
impact? For the investigator of these incidents 
a spatial analysis is worthwhile at least to see 
whether the bombs were placed randomly or in 
a planned way.
 The four cases discussed above show that 
the spatial distributions are different in each of 
the cases. It also shows that the organization 
methods are different even though all of them 
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are multiple blasts. In the Mumbai 1993 and 
the Jaipur incidents RDX was primarily used, 
while in the Ahmedabad 2008 and Bangalore 
2008 incidents the explosives were based 
on Ammonium nitrate. Explosives based on 
Ammonium nitrate are relatively easy to 
obtain and could have been procured locally 
suggesting the involvement of internal terrorist 
groups. However, the knowledge of the group 
about Ahmedabad was obviously limited thus 
resulting in fewer fatalities. In the case of 
Jaipur the area of operation was small and even 
though the bomb placement does not appear 
to be very carefully planned, the impact was 
significant since the material used was lethal, 
and the area chosen was a densely populated 
area, particularly at the time of attack.  It is well 
known that the Mumbai 1993 attack was well 
planned in terms of the explosives used, and the 
locations of the bombs.
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diScuSSionS - a reSearch agenda
A data base on terrorism incidents in India 
that occurred between 1993 and 2010 has been 
built with the idea that this will enable academic 
researchers to understand the problem of 
terrorism in India holistically. The data has been 
collected from open sources primarily from 
English media sources. The database includes 
date and time of the incident, the locations, 
numbers of persons killed and injured, the 
targets chosen, the presumed perpetrators, 
whether a single bomb or multiple bombs 
were used, the explosives used, the packing 
method, the delivery method, delivery vehicle 
and the trigger mechanism used to set off the 
bomb. Every incident is hyperlinked to the 
source document containing the details of the 
incident. A summary of each of the incidents is 
also available.
Of the 63 incidents that have been analysed, 
there were nine incidents involving only attack 
with weapons. These resulted in less than 8 % of 
the total casualties. The Mumbai 2008 incident 
involved rifle attacks, bombs and grenades. 
This single incident resulted in 12 % of the total 
fatalities. Close to 18 % of the fatalities occurred 
in the Mumbai 1993 serial bomb blast.
There are 51 incidents that used only 
bombs. Some of them were serial blasts at 
multiple locations and some were multiple 
blasts in a single location. Many of the incidents 
are single bomb blasts.
Two types of statistical analysis are 
demonstrated using the data base. The first one 
is clustering of the 51 incidents based on the 
explosive materials used, number of bombs, 
number of locations, method of packing, delivery 
method and vehicles used, and the targets. 
Ten clusters are identified. The clusters are 
differentiated primarily by the bomb materials 
used, the delivery vehicles used and whether the 
incidents are single or multiple bomb blasts. 
The second type of analysis is the spatial 
analysis of the distribution of bombs in multiple 
bomb blast incidents. The location of bombs in 
such incidents is critical and indicative of the 
sophistication and organization ability of the 
groups that carry out such acts. This type of 
analysis is demonstrated for four incidents – 
Mumbai 1993, Jaipur 2008, Bangalore 2008, 
and Ahmedabad 2008. Based on this analysis, it 
is possible to determine whether the bombs are 
placed randomly, regularly or in clusters. The 
results suggest that in the case of Jaipur, the 
bombs are placed at regular intervals; in the case 
of Mumbai and Ahmedabad they are clustered. 
The clustering of bombs is an indicator of the 
planning involved in the choice of the locations. 
The Bangalore incident shows both regularity 
and clustering. This kind of spatial analysis 
together with the kind of economic activities 
and demographic profile around the bomb 
location will throw light on why a particular 
location was chosen for the placement of the 
bombs. 
Several questions have emerged from an 
initial analysis of this data:
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Why is it that half the incidents have •	
occurred after 2005? Could this be 
attributed to the political situation in 
Pakistan? Is there a correlation between 
the political situation in Pakistan and the 
number of incidents in India?
Why has Maharashtra been the most •	
preferred target during this period?
Have the targets of attack changed with •	
time? Are there any preferred targets? If 
so, can we secure them?
What kind of explosives is preferred by the •	
terrorists? Has there been a technological 
change in the way the bombs are made 
and used?
Can we assess terrorist groups and their •	
preferred method of attack?
What are the different trigger mechanisms •	
that have been employed to set off the 
bomb thus far? Is there a trend?
Are there similarities in operation between •	
the various Mumbai incidents and other 
multiple bomb blasts in India? Are the 
Mumbai attacks similar to other major 
international incidents?
What are the trigger events that lead to •	
terrorist incidents in India? 
Further in-depth analysis of each of the 
incidents together with other collateral data 
on the political, socio economic, demographic 
profile of the affected region will hopefully 
throw more light on this type of terrorism in 
India. 
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A spatial point pattern is a set of locations 
within a region of interest. For our purpose, the 
locations of the bombs in a multiple serial bomb 
incident constitute a spatial point pattern. In 
our analysis, we treat the study area as a plane 
(although we do know that the earth is not a 
plane) since the area of interest is not very large. 
Points can be distributed in regular pattern, 






A completely spatial random distribution 
of points in space means that given an area A, 
events occur anywhere in this area with equal 
probability and are also independent in the 
sense that they do not interact with each other. 
There are basically two methods to describe a 
spatial pattern. One is in terms of the number 
of events in a pre-defined quadrat. Here we 
statistically analyse the distribution of number 
of events in the quadrats. This is suitable when 
we have a large number of events in the study 
area. This method is usually referred to as first 
order analysis.
The second method is based on the 
distance between events or points in the area 
A. Ripley’s K function belongs to this category24. 
This is referred to as the second order analysis. 
Ripley’s K function hereinafter referred to as K 
function is defined as:
K (r) = (Expected no. of other events 
within distance “r” of an arbitrary event) / λ, 
where λ is the intensity or density of events 
(i.e. number of events per unit area). Thus, if 
there are “n” bombs distributed in area A, λ = 
n/A.
This can be expressed in the form –
K ( r ) = 
,
Annexure 1
method of calculating riPley’S k(r) function
24 For a theoretical development of this function see Ripley, B.D., Spatial Statistics, Wiley Interscience, 1981, Ch. 8 
Pages 167-170, 1981.
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Where I (.) is an indicator function. dij 	(i	≠	j)	
is the distance between point i and point j. 
I (.) = 1 if the distance between the points 
i and j is less than or equal to r 
I (.) = 0 if the distance is greater than r.
I (.) is a count of the number of points that 
fall within a circle of radius r centered at point i. 
The double summation ensures that the 
process is repeated for every point in the study 
area.
Since the study area is often arbitrarily 
decided, corrections for edge effects have to be 
made. 
The edge effects25,26 arise because a circle 
of radius r may not lie entirely inside the study 
area. This is corrected by using Ripley’s weighted 
edge correction that calculates K (r) as,
K ( r) = 
,
Where	w(r)	=	1	–	π-1 cos -1(bi/r ),
Where bi is the shortest distance between 
the centre and the boundary. We have chosen to 
define the study area as a rectangle.
W(r) takes the value 1 if the circle of 
radius r centered at point i is completely inside 
the study area. This kind of weighting actually 
takes the proportion of the circumference of the 
circle with radius r and centered at point i as 
the weight.  
Once the K(r ) values are computed for 
various intervals of r, we plot K( r ) versus r and 
compare	 this	 curve	with	 curve	 of	π	 r2 for the 
same range of values of r. 
If the events are Completely Spatially 
Random (CSR) Ripley’s K function K (r) 
= πr2
If the events are regularly spaced 
Ripley’s K function K (r) will be less 
than πr2 and 
If the events are clustered or 
aggregated  Ripley’s K function K (r) 
will be greater than πr2
In actual application, a transformation of 
K(r) is usually employed called the L function27,28 
which is defined as
L(r)	=	√(k	(	r	)	/π)		–	r
L ( r ) is a linear function and has an 
expected value of 0. 
In this case conditions for CSR is made 
easier.
If  L (r )  = 0, the points are CSR; 
if L ( r )  > 0, the points are said to be 
clustered or aggregated
if  L( r ) < 0, the distribution of points are 
regular. 
In our analysis we plot the L function after 
edge correction for each of the incidents.
25 The need for edge correction and how to implement it is described in Haase Peter, Spatial pattern analysis in ecol-
ogy based on Ripley’s K-function: Introduction and methods of edge correction, Journal of vegetation science 6: 
575-582, 1995. 
26 A demonstaration of the above is available in F. Li and L. Zhang, Comparison of point pattern analysis methods 
for classifying the spatial distributions of spruce-fir stands in the north-east USA, Forestry, Vol. 80, No.3, 337-349, 
2007.
27 Ripley, B.D., Modelling Spatial point patterns, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), 
Vol. 39, No. 2(1977), pp. 172-212
28 Besag, in the discussion of Ripley (1977), suggested the use of a square-root scale to linearize the plot of k(r) vs. r
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The analysis involves calculation of K (r) 
and	comparing	it	with	πr2 for various values of 
r. A circle of radius r is centered at each location 
or point and the number of points within the 
circle is counted. By incrementing the radius r, 
concentric circles are drawn and for each r and 
for a given point the number of points inside 
the circle is counted. This is then repeated for 
all the points or locations in the study area. This 
is illustrated in the Figure 16 below. Draw 
concentric circles with one of the locations as 
centre. In the figure Worli is taken as the centre. 
Count the number of points falling within each 
circle. 
This method can be used to study the spatial 
distribution of the terror events and could form 
the basis for comparing different terror attacks 
from the viewpoint of the organizational 
elements that go into the planning and execution 
of an attack. 
The change in the L function under 
different spatial patterns of terrorist events 
can best be understood through some 
examples.
Figure 17 provides two cases of how 
terrorist events can be spatially distributed.
Figure 17 Example of Clustered points 
(Left) and Regular points (Right)
We calculated the L function for a test data 
of 300 Sq. Km where 16 points are regularly 
distributed. The L function is plotted for 
different distances r ranging from 1 Km to 10 
Km. Figure 18 shows the L function when the 
points are regularly spaced. Observe that the L 
values are all below zero.
Figure 16 Illustration of computation of K function
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Figure 18 L function for hypothetical 
Regular Data Points
Contrast this with case when the data set 
consists of 9 points distributed as two clusters 
in an area of 160 Sq. Km. The L function shown 
in Figure 19 for this data set is distinctly 
different. It shows regularity at small distances 
up to 0.7 Km and then displays clustering (L(r) 
> 0).
Figure 19 L function for hypothetical 
Clustered Data
These are shown just to indicate the nature 
of the curve describing regular distribution of 
points and clustered distribution of points. 
Normally, in the point pattern analysis of natural 
phenomenon, upper and lower confidence 
intervals are drawn for the L function and 
the calculated L curve is compared with these 
intervals. So long as the curve falls inside the 
confidence intervals, the points are said to 
be randomly distributed. In our study we did 
not attempt this because we do not have large 
number of points in the study area.  



